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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA) to protect places of “historical, architectural, or cultural 
significance at the community, State or regional level . . . against 
the force of the wrecking ball.”1 One of the major impacts of the 
NHPA has been to incorporate consideration of historic resources 
into federal agency planning through section 106 of the Act.2 
Although section 106 is procedural in nature,3 the outcome of its 
assessment process can influence a federal agency’s decision to 
either deny a permit application or prescribe mitigation measures.4 
The NHPA’s protections extend beyond the Western concept 
of historic sites as relics of a distant past, to a more expansive 
recognition of traditional cultural properties (TCPs): sites that play 
a major role in a culture’s historically rooted beliefs, customs, and 
practices.5 American Indian tribes sometimes utilize TCP 
designations to protect culturally significant places, including sites 
that are important for religious ceremonies6 or for hunting, fishing, 
or gathering.7 The NHPA requires tribal consultation as part of the 
section 106 process to help ensure that impacts on TCPs are 
considered.8 
 
 1.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3307, 3309. 
Although this is a strong statement of policy, the legislative history also emphasizes 
a “meaningful balance . . . between preservation . . . and new construction.” See id.  
 2.  National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 106, 
80 Stat. 915, 917 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012)).  
 3.  See Neighborhood Ass’n of the Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 
463 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 4.  See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Protecting Pocahontas’s World: The Mattaponi 
Tribe’s Struggle Against Virginia’s King William Reservoir Project, 36 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 1, 74–76 (2012) (describing a permit denial that was later reversed); Thomas 
F. Thornton, Anatomy of a Traditional Cultural Property: The Saga of Auke Cape, 
26 GEO. WRIGHT F. 71 (2009). 
 5.  See PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS F. KING, NAT’L PARK SERV., GUIDELINES 
FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1 (1990, 
rev. 1998) [hereinafter BULLETIN 38]. 
 6.  See, e.g., Jack F. Trope, Existing Federal Law and the Protection of Sacred Sites: 
Possibilities and Limitations, 19 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 1995, at 30. 
 7.  See, e.g., Alice Walker & Greg de Bie, Lake Powell Pipeline Project: Traditional 
Cultural Properties Designation and the Protection of Kaibab Paiute Tribal Resources, in 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CULTURAL RESOURCES, WILDLIFE, AND WATERS OF THE 
U.S. 5-1 (2012). 
 8.  Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,698 (proposed 
Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2013)). 
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1582 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
In practice, federal agencies vary in their implementation of 
section 106.9 This is at least partly influenced by the different legal 
mandates and activities of the various federal agencies.10 
Additionally, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP 
or “Council”), which was created to administer the NHPA,11 allows 
other agencies to promulgate their own section 106 regulations as 
long as they get Council approval.12 These regulations may 
effectively replace the ACHP’s regulations.13 
The Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) promulgated its own 
section 106 regulations in the 1980s.14 The Corps’ regulations are 
problematic, particularly for tribes.15 They significantly limit the 
scope of historic and cultural resource analysis under the NHPA,16 
limit opportunities for tribal consultation,17 and conflict with the 
NHPA’s recognition of traditional cultural properties.18 
Furthermore, the Corps’ reliance on its own regulations 
exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority. The Corps’ 
regulations are out of compliance with the ACHP’s regulations for 
two reasons: (1) they conflict with the ACHP’s regulations in 
significant respects,19 and (2) the Corps has not obtained ACHP 
approval.20 Even if the ACHP did approve the Corps’ regulations, 
 
 9.  See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., CARING FOR THE PAST, MANAGING 
FOR THE FUTURE: FEDERAL STEWARDSHIP AND AMERICA’S HISTORIC LEGACY 15–18 
(2001).  
 10.  See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-88-81, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED 
(1988), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/146614.pdf. 
 11.  16 U.S.C. §§ 470i, 470j (2012). 
 12.  36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a) (2013). 
 13.  Id.; Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. at 77,723 (“The 
procedures would substitute in whole or in part for the Council’s section 106 
regulations. As procedures, they would include formal Agency regulations, but 
would also include departmental or Agency procedures that do not go through 
the formal rulemaking process.”). 
 14.  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C 
(2013)). 
 15.  See infra Part IV. 
 16.  See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 17.  See infra Part IV.D–E. 
 18.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 19.  See infra Part IV. 
 20.  See Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
163 F. Supp. 2d 776, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Tom King, The Corps of Engineers 
Needs an Appendectomy, TOM KING’S CRMPLUS (Dec. 24, 2011, 3:53 PM), http:// 
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2014] EXCEPTIONS TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1583 
such a regulatory delegation exceeds the ACHP’s authority under 
the NHPA.21 This article suggests possible fixes to the Corps’ 
procedures to resolve these inconsistencies and the resulting legal 
uncertainty.22 It concludes that a repeal of the Corps’ regulations is 
necessary to bring the agency’s practices back in line with the 
historic preservation mandate of the NHPA.23 
II. THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 
A. The Framework of the NHPA 
Although statutory protections for historic places have existed 
since the early twentieth century,24 in the wake of post–World War 
II development, it became apparent that these protections were 
inadequate.25 The NHPA incorporated consideration of historic 
and cultural resources into federal agency planning, and it remains 
the cornerstone of federal protections for historic places today.26 
The NHPA establishes the National Register of Historic Places, 
a list of historically and culturally important sites.27 Federal 
agencies are directed to establish preservation programs that 
 
crmplus.blogspot.com/2011/12/corps-of-engineers-needs-appendectomy.html 
(“The [ACHP] and the National Park Service . . . have regularly advised the Corps 
that [its section 106 regulation is] not worth the paper it’s written on.”).  
 21.  See infra Part V. 
 22.  See infra Part VI. 
 23.  See infra Part VII. 
 24.  See Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225, 225 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012)) (authorizing the President to set aside 
national monuments); Historic Sites Act of 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666, 666–668 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–467) (authorizing the Secretary of 
Interior to establish the National Historic Landmark Program). 
 25.  National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 1(c), 
80 Stat. 915, 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(5)) (“[I]n the face of 
ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and residential, 
commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental and 
nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate.”); 
THOMAS F. KING, FEDERAL PLANNING AND HISTORIC PLACES: THE SECTION 106 
PROCESS 15–16 (2000).  
 26.  Walter E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources 
and Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 133, 136 (1995).  
 27.  See National Historic Preservation Act § 101, 80 Stat. at 915–916 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)). A list of properties on the National Register is 
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/research. 
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identify properties eligible for the National Register and plan for 
the protection of those properties.28 Furthermore, section 106 of 
the NHPA mandates that federal agencies consider impacts on sites 
included on or eligible for the National Register before issuing a 
permit or expending federal funds on a project.29 
The NHPA created the ACHP30 to oversee the section 106 
review process.31 Section 106 mandates that federal agencies “afford 
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation . . . a reasonable 
opportunity to comment with regard to [federal] 
undertaking[s].”32 Congress also charged the ACHP with 
rulemaking authority under the NHPA.33 
B. From Historic Architecture to Traditional Cultural Properties: Bulletin 
38 
Even though many historic sites are uniquely significant to 
American Indians, the original framework of section 106 did not 
effectively include tribes, causing many historic sites to be 
overlooked.34 Places of historic significance to tribes are often more 
than vestiges of a remote past; rather, they are places where Indians 
have engaged in religious or cultural practices since time 
immemorial.35 Ceremonial practices were severely impacted by the 
encroaching development that had prompted the enactment of the 
NHPA.36 The section 106 process failed to address these impacts,37 
 
 28.  National Historic Preservation Act § 110, 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2. 
 29.  National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 16 U.S.C. § 470f. Originally, the 
statute required only federal agencies to consider effects on properties already 
included in the National Register. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-422, tit. II, 
§ 201(3), 90 Stat 1313, 1320 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f). The statute 
was amended in 1976 to include properties eligible for the National Register. Id. 
 30.  National Historic Preservation Act § 201(a), 80 Stat. at 917 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470i). 
 31.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470j. 
 32.  Id. § 470f. 
 33.  Id. § 470s.  
 34.  NAT’L PARK SERV., KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES: PROTECTING HISTORIC 
PROPERTIES AND CULTURAL TRADITIONS ON INDIAN LANDS, at iii (1990) [hereinafter 
KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES], available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/crdi/publications 
/Keepers.htm.  
 35.  See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 271–72 (3d 
ed. 2003). 
 36.  Id.; see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95–341, § 1, 92 Stat. 469 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)). 
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despite the congressional finding that “the historical and cultural 
foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of 
our community life.”38 
During the late 1970s, tribes lobbied for legal protections for 
their religious practices,39 culminating in the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act of 1978.40 The Act was a catalyst for action 
to explicitly recognize places of cultural significance in the section 
106 process.41 In 1990, the U.S. Senate directed the National Park 
Service to “report to the Committee on Appropriations on the 
funding needs for the management, research, interpretation, 
protection and development of sites of historical significance on 
Indian lands.”42 The National Park Service responded with a 
report43 and followed up with a guidance document, Bulletin 38, 
the same year.44 
Bulletin 38 articulated the definition of traditional cultural 
properties that became incorporated into the NHPA.45 It defines a 
TCP as a property “eligible for inclusion in the National Register 
because of its association with cultural practices or beliefs of a living 
community that (a) are rooted in that community’s history, and 
(b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity 
of the community.”46 Nothing in Bulletin 38, or the following 
NHPA amendments implementing the TCP concept, restricts TCP 
designations to sites of importance to tribes, but in practice it is 
tribes who primarily utilize TCP designations and Bulletin 38 was 
written with the protection of tribal resources in mind.47 
 
 37.  KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES, supra note 34, at 69. 
 38.  16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (emphasis added).  
 39.  Marilyn Phelan, A History and Analysis of Laws Protecting Native American 
Cultures, 45 TULSA L. REV. 45, 51–52 (2009). 
 40.  American Indian Religious Freedom Act § 1, 92 Stat. 469. 
 41.  BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 2–3. However, even the 1966 version laid the 
groundwork for recognition of culturally significant places. See Patricia L. Parker, 
Traditional Cultural Properties: What You Do and How We Think, 16 CULTURAL 
RESOURCE MGMT., Special Issue, 1993, at 1, 2 (1993). 
 42.  KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES, supra note 34, at i. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  BULLETIN 38, supra note 5. 
 45.  Id. at 1.  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 3. 
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C. Expanding the Scope of the NHPA: The 1992 Amendments 
As a guidance document, Bulletin 38 does not carry the force 
of law.48 Federal agencies were unresponsive to its suggestions, so 
tribes lobbied for a legal mandate.49 The resulting 1992 
amendments incorporated Bulletin 38’s definition of traditional 
cultural properties.50 It specifically provided that 
(A) Properties of traditional religious and cultural 
importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization may be determined to be eligible for 
inclusion on the National Register. 
(B) In carrying out its responsibilities under section 
[106], a Federal agency shall consult with any Indian tribe 
or Native Hawaiian organization that attaches religious 
and cultural significance to properties described in 
subparagraph (A).51 
The amendments also provided for the protection of cultural 
information that may be disclosed through consultation by allowing 
federal officials to keep such information confidential.52 
Other provisions in the 1992 amendments strengthened the 
role of tribes in the section 106 process by implicitly recognizing 
the sovereignty of tribes over their own lands.53 The amended 
NHPA established a process for the creation of Tribal Historic 
Preservation Offices (THPOs), analogous to State Historic 
Preservation Offices (SHPOs).54 The amendments also allowed a 
tribe to apply its own historic preservation regulations in place of 
 
 48.  Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 
1999). But see Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 862–63 (10th Cir. 
1995) (holding that the failure to follow Bulletin 38 violated ACHP regulations 
that require the agency make a “reasonable and good faith effort” to identify 
historic properties). 
 49.  See Progress on Updating National Register Bulletin 38, NAT’L PARK SERVICE 
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nps.gov/nr/publications/guidance/TCP_Public 
Comments/Tom_King_NRB_38_Reading_text.pdf (comments of Tom King, co-
author of Bulletin 38).  
 50.  National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012)). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. § 4020, 106 Stat. at 4765 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470w-3). 
 53.  See id. § 4006(a), 106 Stat. at 4755–57 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470a(d)). 
 54.  See id. 
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ACHP regulations on tribal lands, as long as the tribe’s regulations 
provided equivalent consideration to historic properties and the 
ACHP agreed.55 
While it recognized the role of tribes in historic preservation, 
the 1992 amendments also reaffirmed the ACHP’s advisory role, 
clarifying that the Council has authority to “promulgate such rules 
and regulations as it deems necessary to govern the implemen-
tation of section [106 of this Act] in its entirety.”56 The Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation remains the sole federal agency 
authorized by statute to promulgate implementing regulations for 
section 106.57 
III. THE SECTION 106 PROCESS 
The Council’s implementing regulations create a series of 
steps for the implementation of section 106, incorporating 
provisions for traditional cultural properties and tribal consultation 
from the NHPA’s 1992 amendments.58 
A. Initiating Section 106 
The first step in the section 106 process is to determine 
whether there is an undertaking that triggers section 106.59 The 
statutory definition of undertaking includes projects that receive 
federal funding or require a federal license.60 For example, the 
Corps has responsibilities under section 106 when it issues a dredge 
and fill permit under the Clean Water Act.61 
If there is an undertaking that has the potential to cause 
adverse effects,62 the responsible federal agency must define the 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  16 U.S.C. § 470s. See generally National Historic Preservation Act 
Amendments of 1992 § 4018, 106 Stat. at 4763 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470s) (inserting the phrase “in its entirety”).  
 57.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470s; see also 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E)(i) (requiring 
federal agency procedures to be consistent with the ACHP’s regulations). 
 58.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2013).  
 59.  Id. § 800.3(a). 
 60.  16 U.S.C. § 470w(7); see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y). 
 61.  See J. Cliff McKinney & William A. Eckert, Navigating Treacherous Waters: 
The National Historic Preservation Act and the Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit, 8 ABA 
WATER QUALITY & WETLANDS COMMITTEE NEWSL., Jan. 2009, at 12, 12. 
 62.  36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1) (“If the undertaking is a type of activity that does 
not have the potential to cause effects on historic properties, assuming such 
8
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“area of potential effect” (APE) of the project.63 The APE defines 
the scope of the section 106 analysis.64 The ACHP defines the APE 
as 
the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking 
may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character 
or use of historic properties, if any such properties exist. 
The area of potential effects is influenced by the scale and 
nature of an undertaking and may be different for 
different kinds of effects caused by the undertaking.65 
Thus, the APE is intended to include more than the direct 
“footprint” of a project.66 Indirect effects that should also be 
considered include potential impacts to water quality,67 visual 
effects,68 auditory effects, sociocultural effects,69 and effects on 
plants and animals used for subsistence or religious purposes.70 The 
scope of the affected area determines the geographic scope of the 
section 106 analysis.71 
B. Unique Considerations for Identifying TCPs 
After defining the geographic scope of the section 106 
analysis, the next step is to identify historic properties within the 
APE.72 The section 106 analysis must include “any district, site, 
building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for 
inclusion in the National Register.”73 
 
historic properties were present, the agency official has no further obligations 
under section 106 or this part.”). 
 63.  Id. § 800.4(a)(1). 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Id. § 800.16(d) (emphasis added). 
 66.  THOMAS F. KING, CULTURAL RESOURCE LAWS AND PRACTICE 125 (3d ed. 
2008). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id.; see, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., COMMENTS OF THE 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION ON THE PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION BY 
THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE FOR CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES, LLC TO 
CONSTRUCT THE CAPE WIND ENERGY PROJECT ON HORSHOE SHOAL IN NANTUCKET 
SOUND, MASSACHUSETTS 2–3 (2010) (describing the importance of an unobstructed 
view of the rising sun for ceremonies).  
 69.  This could include changes in land use, tax rates, traffic, quality of life, 
and economic activity. See KING, supra note 66, at 125. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (2013). 
 72.  Id. § 800.4(b). 
 73.  16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012) (emphasis added); see also Colo. River Indian 
9
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Identifying TCPs is not a straightforward process.74 Ordinary 
historical or archeological surveys are insufficient because the 
cultural values that make TCPs significant are often intangible.75 
The features that define them may be rooted in the natural 
landscape,76 yet sites sometimes retain their significance in spite of 
substantial development.77 These characteristics are inconsistent 
with the non-Native cultural conception of historic sites to the 
extent that federal officials may deny the existence of a TCP even 
when it objectively fits the criteria for a TCP designation.78 
This problem is exacerbated because TCPs must often be 
identified through oral tradition, rather than exclusively through 
documentary evidence.79 This puts the onus on tribes to ensure that 
TCPs are included in the section 106 process, which creates 
another conundrum: in the process of attempting to protect 
culturally significant places, tribes may be forced to divulge 
information that would ordinarily be reserved for a select few.80 
 
Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that all 
property that meets the National Register criteria is “eligible property” under 
section 106 and that a determination by the Secretary of Interior that the property 
is likely to meet the National Register criteria is not required). The National 
Register criteria are located at 36 C.F.R. § 60.4. 
 74.  See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 2. 
 75.  See id.  
 76.  See id. at 14. 
 77.  See, e.g., GWEN WESTERMAN & BRUCE WHITE, MNI SOTA MAKOCE: THE LAND 
OF THE DAKOTA 214–15 (2012) (describing TCPs in Minnesota that have retained 
their cultural significance even though they have been severely impacted by 
development). 
 78.  Compare Sacred Site and Traditional Cultural Property Analysis: Bureau of 
Mines Twin Cities Research Center, NAT’L PARK SERVICE 11–12 (Oct. 4, 2006) 
[hereinafter Twin Cities Research Center], http://www.nps.gov/miss/parkmgmt 
/upload/TCPCommentsFinal.pdf (rejecting TCP designation of Coldwater 
Spring), with SUMMIT ENVIROSOLUTIONS, INC. & TWO PINES RES. GRP., LLC, 
THE CULTURAL MEANING OF COLDWATER SPRING: FINAL ETHNOGRAPHIC RESOURCES 
STUDY OF THE FORMER U.S. BUREAU OF MINES TWIN CITIES RESEARCH CENTER 
PROPERTY, HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, at ii (2006), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/miss/coldwater_spring.pdf 
(recommending Coldwater Spring as eligible for TCP designation); see also 
WESTERMAN & WHITE, supra note 77, at 215–18. 
 79.  See Twin Cities Research Center, supra note 78, at 8–9 (doubting validity of 
TCP based on lack of documentary evidence); see also BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, 
at 12. 
 80.  See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions: Native American Conceptions of 
Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 127, 144–45 (2000) (discussing 
10
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Although federal officials have authority to keep information 
confidential under certain circumstances,81 these protections are 
not always sufficient to reassure tribes.82 These issues are 
exacerbated by commonplace mistrust and breakdowns in 
communication between federal agencies and tribes.83 
Once a TCP has been identified, there are further difficulties 
in defining its scope.84 As implied by the statutory definition, 
historic properties can vary greatly in size.85 This is particularly true 
for TCPs, which can vary from small, scattered parcels to cultural 
districts spanning thousands of acres.86 Federal officials often find it 
difficult to deal with large, nebulous historic landscapes.87 Some 
require TCPs to have fixed boundaries even when those boundaries 
are completely arbitrary.88 Commenting on the planned revision of 
Bulletin 38, a consultant called the size and scale of TCPs 
“intimidating.”89 The Bureau of Reclamation commented that TCPs 
should be discrete, small locations that would be easier to 
 
confidentiality concerns regarding survey of Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National 
Forest). 
 81.  16 U.S.C. § 470w-3(a) (2012).  
 82.  See Sarah Palmer et al., Strategies for Addressing Native Traditional Cultural 
Properties, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2005, at 45, 49. 
 83.  See S. Rheagan Alexander, Tribal Consultation for Large-Scale Projects: The 
National Historic Preservation Act and Regulatory Review, 32 PACE L. REV. 895, 909–10 
(2012). 
 84.  See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 20. 
 85.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470f; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., 
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL LANDSCAPES IN THE SECTION 106 REVIEW PROCESS 1 (2012). 
 86.  See Sara K. Van Norman, Protecting Off-Reservation Tribal Resources from State 
and Federal Projects, in EMERGING ISSUES IN TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS 7 (2013 ed.). 
 87.  See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Comments and Recommendations on the 
National Register Bulletin 38: Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Traditional 
Cultural Properties, NAT’L PARK SERVICE 2 (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.nps.gov 
/nr/publications/guidance/TCP_PublicComments/Bureau_of_Reclamation_10 
_29_12.pdf (requesting that TCPs be clearly defined in space even if such 
boundaries are arbitrary to tribes). 
 88.  See Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding a Forest Service decision to deny TCP status to the route of a survival 
march because oral history revealed there were several routes (one for strong men 
and another for women, children, and old people) and thus the route lacked a 
single, concrete boundary). But see KING, supra note 66, at 126–27 (describing a 
Corps decision that a TCP did not need to have boundaries). 
 89.  Kelley L. Uyeoka, Comments on Identifying, Evaluating, & Documenting 
Traditional Cultural Properties for NPS, available at http://www.nps.gov/nr 
/publications/guidance/TCP_PublicComments/TCP_Comments_Uyeoka.pdf. 
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manage.90 However, Bulletin 38 as it is currently written does allow 
for defining arbitrary boundaries when it would otherwise be 
impossible to proceed with a section 106 analysis.91 
C. Predicting and Managing Adverse Effects 
Once a historic site has been identified, the agency must 
determine whether the project will have an adverse effect on the 
property.92 The agency must consider the views of the consulting 
parties, including tribes, and the public in making this 
determination.93 
An adverse effect occurs when an undertaking directly or 
indirectly alters any characteristic qualifying a property for the 
National Register.94 The agency may consider effects that are far 
away in distance or time, as well as cumulative effects, as long as the 
effects are reasonably foreseeable.95 
If the agency determines there will be an adverse effect, then 
the agency must consult with the SHPO or THPO and other 
consulting parties to develop alternatives to avoid, minimize, or 
mitigate the adverse effects.96 The ACHP must be given an 
opportunity to comment on the proposed undertaking and suggest 
mitigation measures.97 The ACHP could suggest denial of the 
permit altogether,98 but it is up to the agency to decide whether to 
implement the ACHP’s suggestions.99 The consultation process may 
 
 90.  Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 87, at 7. 
 91.  See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 20–21. 
 92.  36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a) (2013). 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  Id. § 800.5(a)(1). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. § 800.6(a). 
 97.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 800.9(c)(2)(i) (“[T]he Council 
shall provide the agency official with . . . any possible mitigation of the adverse 
effects.”). 
 98.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.9(i) (“[T]he Council shall provide the agency official 
with its opinion as to whether circumstances justify granting assistance to the 
applicant.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Quechan Indian Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that it 
was lawful for the Bureau of Reclamation to transfer “land[s] on which no eligible 
sites were found” and only retain lands where eligible sites were found pending 
completion of the section 106 process).  
12
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also culminate in a memorandum of agreement between the 
parties on how the undertaking will proceed.100 
Although initial consultation is required, consultation may be 
terminated if the agency, ACHP, SHPO, or THPO determines “that 
further consultation will not be productive.”101 The agency still 
must consider the ACHP’s comments in making a final decision.102 
Historic properties are sometimes discovered during the 
course of an undertaking.103 If there are no prior plans that cover 
the treatment of these properties, the agency must “make 
reasonable efforts to avoid, minimize, or mitigate [impacts] to such 
properties.”104 
IV. AREAS OF REGULATORY CONTRADICTION 
The National Historic Preservation Act grants the ACHP, and 
only the ACHP, the authority to promulgate implementing 
regulations.105 The ACHP has, in turn, delegated the authority to 
other federal agencies to implement alternate procedures for the 
section 106 process, substituting them for the ACHP’s 
regulations.106 But this does not mean that federal agencies can 
implement wildly different section 106 programs. The procedures 
must be consistent with the ACHP’s regulations, and the agency 
must obtain ACHP approval.107 
The Corps did promulgate its own section 106 regulations in 
the 1980s, codified as “Appendix C” to the Corps’ regulations on 
processing permits.108 However, there is no record that the ACHP 
has approved Appendix C,109 and Appendix C conflicts with the 
 
 100.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c). 
 101.  Id. § 800.7(a). 
 102.  See id. § 800.6(c); City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 103.  See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 800.13; Pres. Coal. of Erie Cnty. v. Fed. Transit 
Admin., 129 F. Supp. 2d 551, 562 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 104.  36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b). 
 105.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470s (2012). 
 106.  36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a); Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. 
77,698, 77,723 (proposed Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule codified as amended at 
36 C.F.R. § 800). 
 107.  36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a).  
 108.  See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 41,206, 41,236 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 
app. C (2013)). 
 109.  Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 163 F. 
13
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ACHP’s regulations in several respects.110 In 2005, the Corps issued 
interim guidance111 that improves on some of these areas of 
contradiction, but even this guidance continues to contradict key 
provisions of the ACHP’s regulations.112 
A. Geographic Scope of Analysis 
One serious inconsistency is the Corps’ definition of the “area 
of potential effect” (APE).113 The ACHP defines the APE as “the 
geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly 
or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic 
properties.”114 In contrast, the Corps limits the APE to the “permit 
area.”115 
The Corps may have limited its analysis to the permit area 
based on case law that arose under a different statute, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Like the NHPA, NEPA is a 
procedural statute,116 but it imposes broader environmental review 
requirements than the NHPA.117 Two cases decided in 1980, 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray 118 in the Eighth Circuit and Save 
the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers119 in the Fifth Circuit, 
 
Supp. 2d 776, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 110.  See infra Part IV.A–E. 
 111.  See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR 
IMPLEMENTING APPENDIX C OF 33 CFR PART 325 WITH THE REVISED ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION REGULATIONS AT 36 CFR PART 800 (2005), 
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory 
/InterimGuidance_25apr05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE]. 
 112.  See infra text accompanying notes 134–35, 164–65, 187. 
 113.  See Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 789, 791–92. 
 114.  36 C.F.R. § 800.16(d) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 115.  See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(f) (2013). 
 116.  Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 
(1980). Since NEPA also requires analysis of historic and cultural resources, the 
ACHP regulations allow a section 106 analysis to be undertaken concurrently with 
NEPA. 36 C.F.R. § 800.8. 
 117.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (2006) (stating a declaration of environmental 
policy which, among many things, “assure[s] for all Americans safe, healthful, 
productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings”). 
 118.  621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1980) (determining that the Corps was only 
required to consider environmental impacts to navigable waters, not entire 
transmission line, even though the transmission line would not be possible without 
the Corps permit). 
 119.  610 F.2d 322, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the Corps was not 
required to consider environmental impacts of entire manufacturing plant when 
14
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allowed the Corps to limit the scope of its environmental review 
under NEPA to the Corps’ traditional area of jurisdiction: waters of 
the United States—or the “permit area”—of a project. A few years 
later, the Corps issued Appendix B to its regulations,120 which 
essentially codified Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska and Save the Bay.121 
Appendix B was controversial,122 but the Council on Environmental 
Quality, which has rulemaking authority under NEPA, approved 
the regulations.123 
Appendix C was issued around the same time as Appendix B,124 
and the Corps likely extended its rationale for limiting the scope of 
analysis under NEPA to limiting the APE under the NHPA. Several 
courts have also extended NEPA principles to the NHPA because 
there is much more NEPA case law to draw upon.125 However, 
extending NEPA case law to the NHPA in the context of section 
106 would be a mistake. 
The NHPA’s 1992 amendments put traditional cultural 
properties (TCPs) under the statute’s protection and explicitly 
require federal agencies to consider impacts to TCPs.126 Even if the 
Corps argues that its jurisdiction is constitutionally limited to 
“waters of the United States,”127 Congress can invoke its jurisdiction 
over Indian affairs to require the Corps to consider impacts on 
TCPs.128 Requiring federal agencies to consider impacts to TCPs 
 
granting pipeline construction permit). 
 120.  Environmental Quality, Procedures for Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 49 Fed. Reg. 1387 (proposed Jan. 11, 1984). 
Unlike the NHPA, NEPA allows federal agencies to promulgate regulations to 
bring agency practices in line with the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 4333.  
 121.  Environmental Quality; Procedures for Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 53 Fed. Reg. 3120-01, 3122 (Feb. 3, 1988) (final 
rule) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 230; § 325 app. B (2013)).  
 122.  The Environmental Protection Agency opposed the Corps’ proposal 
and the matter was referred to the Council on Environmental Quality. 
See Implementation of National Environmental Policy Act; Council 
Recommendations, 52 Fed. Reg. 22517-02, 22518 (June 12, 1987). 
 123.  Id. at 22520. 
 124.  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 41206-01 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C). 
 125.  See, e.g., Ringsred v. City of Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that because parking ramp construction was not a NEPA “major Federal 
action[],” it must not be a NHPA “undertaking” either). 
 126.  16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012). 
 127.  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 741 (2006). 
 128.  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201–02 (2004) (explaining that 
15
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effectively expanded their jurisdictional authority, ensuring federal 
programs are consistent with the United States’ trust responsibility 
toward tribes.129 Because the federal government has constitutional 
power over Indian affairs, the Corps cannot claim that 
jurisdictional limitations preclude consideration of TCPs outside of 
the “permit area.” 
The only published NHPA case on point invalidated the 
Corps’ limited definition of the area of potential effect (APE).130 
When Appendix C was still in the proposal stage, a California 
district court held that the Corps’ reliance on its proposed 
regulations was contrary to the statutory language of the NHPA.131 
The court directed the Corps to instead rely on the ACHP’s 
definition of the APE.132 
Yet the Corps went on to finalize its rule the following year.133 
In its 2005 interim guidance, the Corps reiterated its intention to 
continue limiting the scope of the APE.134 The guidance specifically 
referenced and disregarded the ACHP’s regulations.135 
 
jurisdiction over relations with other sovereigns, including Indian nations, is 
vested in the federal government through the “necessary concomitants of 
nationality”). Although the doctrine of plenary power has been repeatedly 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as granting Congress total control over 
Indian affairs, this article does not advocate for plenary power in its current form. 
See Robert T. Coulter, The Plenary Power Doctrine, in NATIVE LAND LAW § 6.13 (West, 
Westlaw 2013) (“[In early decisional law, t]he plenary power doctrine simply 
referred to the fact that the Constitution gave the limited powers that the federal 
government could exercise in relation to Indian nations to Congress and left no 
residual powers to the states.”).  
 129.  See generally Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal 
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417 (2013) (describing 
federal common law and statutory sources of the trust responsibility). 
 130.  Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1441 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (preliminarily enjoining the Corps from issuing a permit for the placement 
of riprap). The only other case on point is McGehee v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
in which the court decided the regulations did not conflict in that particular case. 
Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–160–H, 2011 WL 2009969, at *5 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 
2011). 
 131.  Colo. River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1437; see also 16 U.S.C. § 470f. 
 132.  Colo. River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1437. 
 133.  Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C 
(2013)). 
 134.  2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 111, at (6)(d) (“The definition of 
‘permit area’ in Appendix C . . . should continue to be used.”). 
 135.  Id.  
16
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B. Identification of Historic Properties 
The ACHP’s regulations require agencies to consult with tribes 
in the process of identifying historic properties within the APE.136 
This is another area where the Corps has enumerated exceptions in 
an attempt to limit its section 106 responsibilities.137 Appendix C 
provides for three situations in which the district engineer may 
unilaterally determine that there is little likelihood that historic 
properties exist or may be affected: (1) areas that have been 
extensively modified by previous work, (2) areas created in modern 
times, and (3) work that is so limited in scope that it is unlikely to 
affect historic properties even if they were present.138 The ACHP’s 
regulations provide for the third exception, but not for the first 
two.139 
Appendix C’s first exception, areas modified by previous work, 
potentially excludes TCPs from analysis. A TCP may retain its 
cultural and historic significance even after development 
significantly modifies the area.140 Since the Corps’ regulations do 
not mention the concept of TCPs, there is even more danger that 
TCPs may be left out of a Corps section 106 analysis.141 TCPs can be 
easily overlooked absent proper consultation, since the cultural 
values that make a TCP significant are often intangible.142 
C. Determination of Adverse Effects 
Another way Appendix C limits the Corps’ responsibility is by 
narrowing the definition of adverse effects.143 The ACHP has 
provided for an expansive definition of adverse effect: 
 
 136.  36 C.F.R. 800.4(b) (2013).  
 137.  See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(3)(b).  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1). 
 140.  See, e.g., WESTERMAN & WHITE, supra note 77, at 214–15 (describing TCPs 
in Minnesota that have retained their cultural significance even though they have 
been severely impacted by development). 
 141.  SOC’Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, REMARKS ON THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ 
NOTICE OF INTENT AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS FOR THE RETROSPECTIVE 
REVIEW OF REGULATIONS AT 33 CFR 320–332 AND 334 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 
13563 (2012), available at http://www.saa.org/Portals/0/SAA/GovernmentAffairs 
/SAA_APPENDIXC_REVIEW_2012.pdf. 
 142.  BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 14. 
 143.  See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15). 
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when an undertaking may alter, directly or indirectly, any of 
the characteristics of a historic property that qualify the 
property for inclusion in the National Register in a 
manner that would diminish the integrity of the 
property’s location, design, setting, materials, workman-
ship, feeling, or association . . . . Adverse effects may 
include reasonably foreseeable effects caused by the 
undertaking that may occur later in time, be farther removed in 
distance or be cumulative.144 
The ACHP’s regulations list several examples of potential 
adverse effects, including visual, atmospheric, or auditory effects.145 
The ACHP’s regulations also specifically provide that transfer, 
lease, or sale of the property out of federal ownership or control 
may be an adverse effect, unless there are legally enforceable 
conditions to ensure long-term preservation of the property’s 
historic character.146 
In contrast, the Corps provides three exceptions where an 
effect will not be considered adverse: (1) where the property only 
has research value and that value can be substantially preserved by 
conducting research, (2) when the undertaking is limited to 
rehabilitation of buildings and structures, or (3) when the 
undertaking is limited to the transfer, lease, or sale of historic 
property.147 
The research exception in the Corps’ regulations is out of 
date. In 1986, the year Appendix C was adopted, the ACHP’s 
regulations also contained a research exception,148 but the ACHP 
eliminated this exception in 1999.149 The destruction of an 
archeological site or another property with research value is now 
unambiguously an adverse effect under the ACHP’s regulations.150 
The regulations do provide that an agency may comply with the 
Archeological and Historic Preservation Act in the place of the 
NHPA when a property is valued solely for its scientific or 
archeological data, but this provision only covers post-review 
discoveries.151 Therefore, the Corps’ blanket exception for 
 
 144.  36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 145.  Id. § 800.5(a)(2). 
 146.  Id. § 800.5(a)(2)(vii). 
 147.  33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(c). 
 148.  See KING, supra note 25, at 73. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(2). 
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properties of pure research value is out of sync with the current 
ACHP regulations.152 
D. Tribal Consultation 
Consultation with tribes is an integral component of the 
common law federal trust responsibility.153 Effective consultation is 
also crucial to achieving the goal of cultural resource protection 
under section 106154 because consultation is often the only way to 
identify TCPs.155 
The ACHP’s regulations incorporate the tribal consultation 
requirements of the 1992 amendments.156 Any tribe that attaches 
cultural significance to a property that “may be affected by an 
undertaking,” regardless of the location of the historic property, 
should be included as a consulting party.157 This includes 
consultation on the scope of the APE, the identification and 
evaluation of historic properties, the potential effects of the 
undertaking on the properties, and the resolution of adverse 
effects.158 
Appendix C provides only that tribes may be consulted as part 
of the district engineer’s investigations.159 Its language does not 
require consultation with tribes at any point.160 Where tribes are 
 
 152.  Compare 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(c) (providing three exceptions 
for undertakings that would otherwise be considered adverse), with 36 C.F.R. 
§ 800.5(a) (describing potential adverse effects without providing exceptions). 
 153.  See generally Routel & Holth, supra note 129. 
 154.  Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1408 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
 155.  See Dean B. Suagee & Jack F. Trope, Protection of Native American Sacred 
Places on Federal Lands, 54 ROCKY MNT. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, § 12.02[2][c] (2008). 
 156.  Compare National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006, 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 470A(d)(1)(C) (2012)) (“The Secretary shall consult with Indian 
tribes, other Federal agencies, State Historic Preservation Officers, and other 
interested parties . . . .”), with 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (discussing 
consultation on tribal lands in the absence or presence of an appointed THPO 
and the consultation on historic properties of significance).  
 157.  36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 158.  Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
 159.  33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(e) (2013) (“[I]nvestigations may consist of . . . 
further consultations with . . . Indian tribes . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 325, 
app. C(9)(a) (“[M]ay coordinate . . . with . . . any appropriate Indian tribe . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 160.  See id. § 325 app. C. 
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mentioned, they are referred to on similar terms as other 
interested parties.161 
Appendix C weakens requirements for not only (non-THPO) 
tribal consultation, but also consultation with the SHPO or THPO 
in the process of determining the APE.162 Under the ACHP’s 
regulations, agencies are required to consult with the SHPO or 
THPO when defining the APE.163 But the Corps’ interim guidance 
provides only that “[t]he district engineer can, in unusual or 
complex projects, seek the views of the SHPO/THPO before 
making the final determination.”164 Where the limitation of 
“unusual or complex projects” originates, or what it means, is a 
mystery.165 
When it comes to identification of historic properties, the 
ACHP’s regulations require the agency official to consult not only 
with the SHPO or THPO, but with “any Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization that might attach religious and cultural 
significance to properties within the area of potential effects.”166 
Consultation should be initiated “early in the undertaking’s 
planning, so that a broad range of alternatives may be considered 
during the planning process.”167 The ACHP also specifies that the 
agency official should consider applicable tribal laws when 
identifying historic properties.168 The Corps’ regulations, in 
contrast, do not mention tribes (or even THPOs) in the context of 
identifying historic properties. Appendix C merely requires that the 
district engineer consult with the SHPO and “other appropriate 
sources of information.”169 
Appendix C further limits consultation requirements when the 
district engineer determines there is little likelihood that historic 
properties exist or will be affected.170 In such cases, Appendix C 
requires the district engineer only to provide public notice 
 
 161.  See, e.g., id. § 325 app. C(4)(a) (public notice will be sent to tribes). 
 162.  See id. § 325 app. C(5)(f) (limiting investigation to the permit area with 
no provision for consultation). 
 163.  36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a).  
 164.  2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 111, at (6)(d). 
 165.  See id.  
 166.  36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b). 
 167.  Id. § 800.1(c). 
 168.  Id. § 800.4(b)(1).  
 169.  33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(3)(a) (2013). 
 170.  Id. § 325 app. C(3)(b). 
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explaining the determination.171 Considering that the district 
engineer might not consult with tribes in defining the area of 
potential effect, this means a tribe might not find out that the 
undertaking affects a TCP until the public notice stage.172 
Public notice is not an adequate procedure for government- 
to-government consultation,173 which is most effective when 
commenced as early as possible in the federal decision-making 
process.174 Additionally, Appendix C limits consideration of 
properties that are discovered during the public comment stage: 
“The evidence must set forth specific reasons for the need to further 
investigate within the permit area . . . .”175 This language may be 
merely an attempt to reword the ACHP’s regulation for properties 
discovered post-review, which requires an agency official to specify 
the National Register criteria used to assume the property is 
eligible for section 106 analysis.176 But the language of Appendix C 
implies that it is the interested party who must supply specific 
reasons to investigate further, even when concerns arise during the 
initial review process.177 This places an unnecessary burden on 
 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  See Routel & Holth, supra note 129, at 456 (“There is a fundamental 
difference between the public participation process (notice and comment), which 
is an information-gathering exercise, and consultation, which is a government-to-
government process that requires greater involvement in decision making by 
Indian tribes.”). See generally 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (defining consultation as the 
process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of other participants, 
and, where feasible, seeking agreement with them). 
 174.  See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Consulting with Tribes for Off-Reservation Projects, 
25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2010, at 54, 56; Walker & de Bie, supra 
note 7, at 5-15; Carol Berry, Pipeline Creates Tribal Dissent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2010 
/09/27/pipeline-creates-tribal-dissent-81747.  
 175.  33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(a) (emphasis added). 
 176.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(c) (2013) (“The agency official . . . may assume a 
newly-discovered property to be eligible for the National Register for purposes of 
section 106. The agency official shall specify the National Register criteria used to 
assume the property’s eligibility so that information can be used in the resolution 
of adverse effects.”). 
 177.  See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(a) (“When the initial review, addition 
submissions by the applicant, or response to the public notice indicates the 
existence of a potentially eligible property, the district engineer shall examine the 
pertinent evidence . . . .”). 
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tribes who may not have been adequately informed prior to the 
public comment stage.178 
Both the ACHP’s and the Corps’ regulations allow for 
termination of consultation where consultation proves 
unproductive.179 But the two regulations specify different terms 
under which termination may occur.180 The ACHP’s regulations 
allow termination only when consultation to resolve adverse effects 
has been attempted and failed.181 Any party may terminate 
consultation, including the tribe.182 If it is the agency that chooses 
to terminate consultation, the agency official must provide the 
ACHP an opportunity to comment.183 Although the Corps can 
terminate consultation under Appendix C, there is no mention of 
other parties terminating consultation.184 Furthermore, Appendix 
C discusses ACHP comments, but does not explicitly say that the 
Corps must provide the ACHP with the opportunity to comment.185 
The Corps took steps to correct these problems by including 
provisions on tribal consultation in its 2005 interim guidance, but 
the guidance still lacks detail on when and how consultation should 
occur during the section 106 process.186 The Department of 
Defense 187 and the Corps188 have also issued guidance documents, 
pursuant to executive order,189 that broadly define tribal 
 
 178.  See id. § 325 app. C(3)(b). 
 179.  Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a) (“After consulting to resolve adverse effects 
pursuant to § 800.6(b)(2), the agency official, the SHPO/THPO, or the Council 
may determine that further consultation will not be productive and terminate 
consultation.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(8) (“The district engineer will 
terminate any consultation immediately upon determining that further 
consultation is not productive.”). 
 180.  Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(8). 
 181.  36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a).  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id. § 800.7(a)(1). 
 184.  33 C.F.R. § 324 app. C(8). 
 185.  See id. 
 186.  2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 111, at 1, ¶ 2. The guidance refers to 
the government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal 
government and specifies that public notice alone is inadequate consultation. Id. 
 187.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POLICY (2012). 
The Corps of Engineers is a component of the Department of Defense.  
 188.  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY (2012); see also 
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CONSULTING WITH TRIBAL NATIONS: GUIDELINES FOR 
EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH TRIBAL PARTNERS (2010).  
 189.  See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); 
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consultation procedures, but these documents are not specific to 
section 106.190 In practice, the Corps’ guidance on tribal 
consultation has been applied inconsistently,191 perhaps because 
agency guidance is less enforceable than legislative rules.192 
E. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a major concern for tribes seeking protection 
of traditional cultural properties.193 When the public becomes 
informed about the location and character of a sacred site, the site 
may be subject to desecration,194 and religious practitioners may 
fear for their privacy and safety.195 Even absent this threat, there 
may be cultural concerns with disclosing the location of sacred 
sites.196 This kind of information may be privileged to the extent 
that it is reserved for only a certain segment of the tribe’s 
population.197 Tribes may be so reluctant to divulge information 
about sacred places that they may delay action until faced with the 
possibility of complete destruction of the site.198 By the time such 
destruction is imminent enough to warrant divulging privileged 
information, it may be too late in the section 106 process to protect 
the site.199 
 
Memorandum: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
 190.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 188; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
CONSULTING WITH TRIBAL NATIONS: GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH 
TRIBAL PARTNERS, supra note 188; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, TRIBAL 
CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note 188. 
 191.  See SOC’Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141. 
 192.  United States v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th 
Cir. 1982). See generally 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:63 (West, Westlaw, 3d ed. 2014). 
 193.  See Palmer et al., supra note 82, at 45.  
 194.  See, e.g., Beth Kampschror, In Pot-Hunter Country, A Small Effort at Healing, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., (July 30, 2009), http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_12949608. 
 195.  See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 861 n.5 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
 196.  See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 19. 
 197.  Charles W. Smythe, The National Register Framework for Protecting Cultural 
Heritage Places, 26 GEO. WRIGHT F. 14, 19 (2009); see, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4, 
at 68 (“Because of the belief that such sites and their locations should not be 
discussed with outsiders, the Tribe did not disclose the site’s existence until it 
appeared there was no other choice.”). 
 198.  See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4, at 68. 
 199.  See Progress on Updating National Register Bulletin 38, supra note 49. 
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To mitigate this problem, the NHPA and the ACHP’s 
regulations require agency officials to take confidentiality concerns 
into account during the process of identifying historic properties.200 
The agency is required to withhold information about the location, 
character, or ownership of a historic property from documentation 
“when disclosure may cause a significant invasion of privacy[,] risk 
of harm to the historic property[,] or impede the use of a 
traditional religious site by its practitioners.”201 
In contrast, Appendix C only protects information from 
disclosure when there is a “substantial risk of harm, theft, or 
destruction.”202 This provision does not include language that 
protects the integrity of TCPs for the purpose of cultural 
practices.203 While destruction of property is one cause of concern 
for tribes, the cultural uses of a TCP are often significant.204 Thus, 
cultural uses of a property warrant protection, as provided for in 
the ACHP’s regulations.205 
V. UNAUTHORIZED DELEGATION OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 
Since Appendix C is inconsistent with the Protection of 
Historic Properties regulations under 36 C.F.R. section 800, at 
least three district courts have enjoined the Corps from using 
Appendix C.206 This calls the legality of the Corps’ implementing 
 
 200.  See National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4020, 
16 U.S.C. § 470w-3 (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c) (2013). Even the ACHP’s 
regulations may be inadequate to protect confidentiality. Protection of Historic 
Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,714–15 (proposed Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule 
codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. § 800) (pointing out tribal confidentiality issues 
in proposed rule). 
 201.  36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1). 
 202.  33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(4)(c) (2013).  
 203.  See id. 
 204.  See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4, at 68 (describing importance of site for 
religious ceremonies). 
 205.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1). 
 206.  See Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (invalidating Corps definition of “permit area” in Appendix C, which was a 
proposed regulation at the time); Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 163 F. Supp. 2d 776, 791–92 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (voiding permit 
the Corps issued without waiting for ACHP comment); Slayer Park Vill. Council v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. C-1-02-832, 2003 WL 22423202, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 
Jan. 17, 2003) (permanently enjoining construction permit because Corps 
improperly terminated consultation). But see Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 
636 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Corps could follow a provision in 
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regulations into question, creating an uncertainty that not only 
impacts tribes, but impedes the ability of project developers to plan 
effectively.207 
Even if the ACHP did authorize the Corps to promulgate its 
own regulations, the legality of such a delegation is dubious.208 For 
regulations to carry the force of law, Congress must first delegate 
regulatory authority to the promulgating agency, either explicitly 
or implicitly.209 Authority to promulgate regulations can only come 
from an authorizing and empowering statute.210 A federal agency 
does not have independent legislative power.211 Thus, the Council 
cannot grant rulemaking authority, only Congress can.212 
It could be argued that by delegating general authority over 
section 106 to the ACHP, Congress also delegated the authority to 
further delegate. In that case, a Chevron analysis would be 
required.213 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council requires 
deference to agency interpretation of statutes, but only when a two-
part test has been satisfied.214 First, the provision of the statute 
interpreted by the agency must be ambiguous, such that the agency 
is filling in the blanks left by Congress rather than rewriting the 
law.215 If there is ambiguity in the statute, then the question 
becomes whether the agency’s regulation is a permissible 
construction of the statute.216 Courts defer to an agency’s 
construction of statutory ambiguity unless the agency’s 
interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.217 
 
Appendix C that allows the Corps to rely on a lead agency in complying with the 
NHPA); McGehee v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:11-CV-160-H, 2011 WL 
2009969, at *5 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (holding that the ACHP and Corps 
definitions of the APE did not conflict under the circumstances). 
 207.  See McKinney & Eckert, supra note 61, at 13. 
 208.  See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 132 (2004).  
 209.  Id. § 131. 
 210.  Id. § 130. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  See id. 
 213.  See 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & 
PRACTICE § 11:30 (West, Westlaw, 3d ed. 2014). 
 214.  See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 215.  See id. at 843–45. 
 216.  Id.  
 217.  Id. The U.S. Supreme Court recently extended this analysis to the scope 
of an agency’s regulatory authority. Under City of Arlington v. FCC, when a statute 
delegates general rulemaking authority to an agency, the agency is entitled to 
Chevron deference in determining the scope of its regulations. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 
25
Lorentz: Engineering Exceptions to Historic Preservation Law: Why the Army
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] EXCEPTIONS TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1605 
Although the Chevron test grants significant deference to 
agency rulemaking, in practice the outcome of Chevron deference is 
so inconsistent that it has been called a lottery.218 Much comes 
down to step one of the Chevron analysis: statutory interpretation.219 
A textualist is much less likely to find statutory ambiguity than an 
intentionalist.220 
Applying a textualist approach, the NHPA authorizes the 
Council “to promulgate such rules and regulations as it deems 
necessary to govern the implementation of section [106] in its 
entirety.”221 This is a broad grant of general authority.222 It could be 
argued that if the Council deems it necessary to delegate 
rulemaking power, the plain meaning of the statue gives the 
Council the power to do so.223 But applying the ordinary rules of 
statutory interpretation, delegation to one authority excludes 
delegation to another.224 If Congress intended to delegate authority 
to other agencies besides the ACHP, it would have done so 
explicitly.225 In fact, Congress did specify that the ACHP may 
delegate authority to tribes under certain circumstances.226 The fact 
that Congress explicitly provided for delegation to tribes indicates 
 
1868 (2013). Still, even in City of Arlington, Congress has to delegate power to the 
agency in the first place. See id. at 1874 (emphasizing that Congress granted FCC 
general authority to administer the statute at issue). 
 218.  See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2013) (an 
empirical study of the application of Chevron in practice). 
 219.  Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s 
Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 149 (2012). 
 220.  Id. at 175–77.  
 221.  16 U.S.C. § 470s (2012) (emphasis added). 
 222.  See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
 223.  See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2013) (quoting Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (holding 
that when a statute’s language is plain, the court should enforce it according to its 
terms); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 67 (2012). 
 224.  Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013) (quoting Andrus v. 
Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)) (applying the canon of expressio 
unius: the mention of one thing in a statute excludes another); 73 AM. JUR. 2D 
Statutes § 120. 
 225.  See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 
(2005) (“We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text 
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.”). 
 226.  National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(5)). 
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that Congress intentionally decided not to delegate authority to 
other federal agencies.227 
The legislative history behind NHPA and its 1992 amendments 
also show that ACHP’s delegation of its own rulemaking authority 
violates legislative intent.228 The Council was created for the express 
and sole purpose of overseeing implementation of the National 
Historic Preservation Act.229 The statutory language of the 1992 
amendments reaffirmed the ACHP’s authority over the section 106 
process.230 The amendments were added to “clarif[y] that it is the 
responsibility of the Advisory Council to promulgate such rules and 
regulations it deems necessary to govern the implementation of 
section 106 of NHPA in its entirety.”231 The congressional record 
emphasizes that “the ACHP has the authority to define . . . how 
agencies should take effects on historic properties into account in 
their planning.”232 Thus, both the text of the statute and its 
legislative history show that Congress intended to delegate 
authority to the ACHP and the ACHP only. 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
A. Regulatory Fix 
The most straightforward solution to the problem of 
contradictory regulations is to change the regulations themselves. 
Some commentators, including the Society for American 
Archaeology, have recommended repealing Appendix C 
 
 227.  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 (2009).  
 228.  See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 83 for a discussion of the role of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation. 
 229.  See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3307, 
3307 (listing creation of the ACHP as part of the three-fold purpose of the NHPA, 
along with creation of the National Register and the encouragement of local, 
regional, state, and national interest in protecting historic properties); see also 
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 87 (discussing the persuasiveness of committee reports in 
statutory interpretation). 
 230.  National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4018, 106 Stat. 4600, 4762 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 470s) (adding the phrase “in its entirety” to the end). 
 231.  S. REP. NO. 102-336 (1992), 1992 WL 429995, at *17.  
 232.  137 CONG. REC. S3564-02 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Fowler).  
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altogether.233 Because there are many points of inconsistency, a 
repeal would be the simplest and most comprehensive fix.234 
A less desirable solution would be to amend Appendix C, a 
course of action the Corps has been considering since at least 
2005.235 Amendments should eliminate the Corps’ definition of 
“area of potential effect” and incorporate the ACHP’s definition.236 
The Corps should also eliminate the exceptions that allow the 
district engineer to determine that historic properties are unlikely 
to be present and the exceptions to what may be considered an 
“adverse effect.”237 There need to be stronger provisions for 
confidentiality, and tribal consultation should be integrated 
throughout the section 106 process.238 At minimum, the Corps 
should promulgate regulations that would make enforceable the 
consultation provisions already laid out in guidance documents.239 
Another alternative would be to repeal Appendix C and 
negotiate a prototype programmatic agreement with the ACHP in 
consultation with other stakeholders, including SHPOs, THPOs, 
tribes, and the public.240 Prototype programmatic agreements are 
meant to streamline the section 106 process to fit the needs of 
 
 233.  See SOC’Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141. 
 234.  See id.  
 235.  Memorandum from Lawrence A. Lang, Acting Chief, Operations, 
Directorate of Civil Works, to Major Subordinate Commands and Dist. Commands 
(Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks 
/regulatory/inter_guide2007.pdf. 
 236.  Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) (2013) (“Area of potential effects means 
the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly or 
indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic properties, if any 
such properties exist. The area of potential effects is influenced by the scale and 
nature of an undertaking and may be different for different kinds of effects caused 
by the undertaking.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(1)(e) (2013) (“[A]n ‘effect’ on 
a ‘designated historic property’ occurs when the undertaking may alter the 
characteristics of the property that qualified the property for inclusion in the 
National Register. Consideration of effects on ‘designated historic properties’ 
includes indirect effects of the undertaking. The criteria for effect and adverse 
effect are described in Paragraph 15 of this appendix.”). 
 237.  Compare 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(b)(3) (describing exceptions when 
impacts otherwise considered adverse may be found not adverse), with 36 C.F.R. 
§ 800.5(a)(1) (containing no exceptions to the criteria for adverse effect). 
 238.  See supra Part IV.D–E. 
 239.  See 1 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 192, § 4:63. 
 240.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b)(4); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., 
PROTOTYPE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT GUIDANCE 2 (2012), available at http://www 
.achp.gov/docs/guidance_prototype_agreements.pdf. 
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particular programs.241 Once the ACHP authorizes the prototype, 
the Corps can use its procedures to implement section 106 for 
individual projects.242 
B. Legislative Fix 
The National Trust on Historic Preservation has published a 
report that suggests the organic act of a federal agency affects its 
implementation of section 106.243 The report points out that the 
organic act of the Forest Service, which has a poor track record 
under the NHPA, contains no mention at all of protecting historic 
places.244 On the other hand, the organic act of the Bureau of Land 
Management, an agency with a better reputation for protecting 
historic properties, explicitly includes protection of historic sites.245 
Like the Forest Service, the Corps lacks any mandate in its 
founding legislation to protect historic sites.246 Protection of 
historic places was not on Congress’s radar when it enacted 
legislation to permanently establish an Army Corps of Engineers in 
1802.247 The current mission of the Corps is “to strengthen our 
Nation’s security, energize the economy and reduce risks from 
disasters.”248 This mission emphasizes economic development, 
which is perhaps the impetus for the Corps’ stated regulatory policy 
“to avoid unnecessary regulatory controls.”249 The general permit 
program, which Appendix C is attached to, “is the primary method 
of eliminating unnecessary federal control.”250 
If the Corps’ lack of compliance is rooted in its core mission, 
then the solution should extend beyond Appendix C. Indeed, the 
Corps has a track record of noncompliance that extends beyond 
 
 241.  ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., supra note 240. 
 242.  See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b)(4); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., supra 
note 240. 
 243.  NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM: 
CULTURAL RESOURCES AT RISK 11 (May 2008). Congress created the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation to facilitate public participation in historic preservation. 
16 U.S.C. § 468 (2012). 
 244.  NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243, at 11. 
 245.  Id.  
 246.  See Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 132. 
 247.  See id.  
 248.  Mission and Vision, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, http://www.usace.army.mil 
/About/MissionandVision (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 249.  33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(3) (2013). 
 250.  Id.  
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reliance on its own regulations.251 But when it comes to protection 
of traditional cultural properties, the issue goes beyond 
noncompliance with the NHPA. Even when following the ACHP’s 
regulations, the agency official has discretion in whether to 
approve or deny a permit.252 This ultimate decision may be 
influenced by the mission of the agency.253 Thus, one component 
of a comprehensive solution would be to enact legislation 
incorporating historic preservation into the Corps’ core mission.254 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The National Historic Preservation Act is the cornerstone of 
historic resource protection in American law.255 In particular, it is 
an important source of recognition for culturally significant 
places.256 The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation was 
created to oversee the implementation of this mandate.257 Thus, 
Congress gave the ACHP broad authority over the section 106 
process.258 By promulgating and utilizing regulations that narrow its 
section 106 responsibilities, the Corps of Engineers has violated 
both the intent and the letter of the law.259 Not only does Appendix 
C allow the Corps to avoid the section 106 review process,260 but it 
may have the effect of excluding analysis of traditional cultural 
properties as mandated by Congress.261 The inconsistent 
 
 251.  See, e.g., Lucus Ritchie, The Failure of the National Historic Preservation Act in 
the Missouri River Basin and a Proposed Solution, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J., 
Spring 2005, at 1, 8–11 (describing the Corps of Engineer’s failure to comply with 
a section 106 programmatic agreement, resulting in harm to several historic 
properties, including exposure of a grave site). 
 252.  See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“[S]ection 106 imposes no substantive standards on agencies, but it does require 
them to solicit the Council’s comments . . . .”). 
 253.  See NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243. 
 254.  See id. 
 255.  138 CONG. REC. H11493-01 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. 
Vento); Water E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and 
Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 133, 136 (1995). 
 256.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012). 
 257.  See id. §§ 470i, 470j. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  See supra Part IV. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  See National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4006(a), 
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6). 
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regulations also cause uncertainty for project developers.262 The 
Corps’ authority to follow its own regulations may be successfully 
challenged in court, further delaying a project.263 
The Corps’ regulations for section 106 may internally make 
sense because they reflect the Corps’ own mission to promote 
economic development.264 The Corps’ mission and authorizing 
statutes do not integrate historic preservation into the agency’s 
mandate.265 This is exactly the reason that the ACHP should be the 
agency with sole authority to implement the NHPA—when other 
agencies have conflicting missions, they are likely to prioritize other 
values over historic preservation.266 Therefore, the best solution for 
the problems created by these incongruent regulations is to repeal 
Appendix C.267 
 
 262.  McKinney & Eckert, supra note 61, at 12.  
 263.  See, e.g., Crutchfield v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 154 F. Supp. 2d 878, 
905–06 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 264.  See Mission and Vision, supra note 248. 
 265.  Id.  
 266.  See NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243.  
 267.  See SOC’Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141. 
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